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ABSTRACT
In the presence of two-sided altruism, i.e., when parents and children care about each
other’s utility, increases in parental income need not always lead to increases in schooling
and to decreases in child labor. This surprising result derives from the systematic way
capital market constraints bind as parental income rises: child labor increases as soon as
parental income rises by enough to eliminate transfers from children to parents.
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I. Introduction
In an influential paper, Baland and Robinson (2000: BR) address the important
question of the economic efficiency of child labor. Their fundamental finding is that
child labor can be inefficient in the presence of capital market constraints, i.e., when
parental savings, parental bequests to children, and children’s transfers to their parents
are restricted not to be negative.
In this paper, we identify a surprising property of the BR model: in the presence
of two-sided altruism, i.e., when parents and children care about each other’s utility,
some households with higher incomes will send their children to school for fewer hours,
and to work for more hours, than households with lower incomes. Increases in parental
income need not always lead to increases in schooling and to decreases in child labor.
That low parental income is a proximate cause of child labor is an idea that is
almost universally accepted in both the theoretical literature on child labor and in more
policy-oriented work.
1 However, household-level empirical studies often fail to find an
inverse link between household incomes and child labor.
2 Our results may offer a reason
why: the relationship between child labor and parental income may be neither
continuous nor monotonically decreasing. Although there is no empirical work that
directly examines this possibility, recent literature on transfers from adult children to
their parents in developing countries has found transfer behavior that is quite consistent
with the implied behavior of transfers in this model. We believe that the bridge between
child labor and intergenerational transfer behavior might be an important one to explore
1 For theory see, e.g., Basu and Van (1998), Baland and Robinson (2000), Rogers and Swinnerton (2002),
Dessy and Vencatachellum (2002), Ranjan (2001). For more policy-oriented work see, e.g, International
Labor Office (2002), U.S. Department of Labor (2000), Fallon and Tzannatos (1998).
2 For surveys of this literature, see Edmonds (2002) and Dar et al (2002).3
further for researchers and policymakers interested in knowing what works in addressing
the problem of child labor.
The next section outlines the BR model and presents our main result. Section III
shows how the main result works in a parametric example. Section IV relates our
findings to the empirical literatures on child labor and on transfers from children to
parents. Section V concludes.
II. The Model
We begin with a slightly modified version of the BR model with two-sided
altruism.
3 Every family has one parent and one child. There are two periods. In the
first period, each child is a member of her parent’s household. In the second period, adult
children maintain separate households from their parents. Every parent works only in the
first period and supplies one unit of labor, which has a value, in efficiency units, of A.
4
Children may also work during the first period; any time they spend at work has a value,
in efficiency units, of 1. Time not spent working is spent in school. Any labor income a
child receives is controlled by her parent. When children become adults (in the second
period) they control their own incomes. They then supply one unit of labor, which has a
value in efficiency units that depends on the amount of schooling they received during
the first period. As in BR, we assume the return to education is given by the function
h(e), which is assumed to have the properties 1 ) 0 ( = h , 0 ) ( ' > e h ,a n d 0 ) ( ' ' < e h .T h e
single produced output good is the numeraire.
3 This differs from their model in two ways: (1) in order to highlight the role of differing degrees of
concern about each others’ welfare, we assume the utility function is the same for parent and child, and (2)
we assume parental income is received only in the first period. Neither of these simplifying assumptions is
essential to our results.
4 Later we will allow A to vary and will refer to particular values of A using lower-case a.4
Only the parent makes decisions in the first period. Each parent receives income
A for her own labor and income (1-e) for her child’s labor. The parent decides how much
time her child will spend at school (e) and at work (1-e), and how much of the total
income (A +( 1 - e)) to consume (
1
p c ), and how much to save (s): e A s c p − + = + 1
1 .
In the second period, decisions are made both by the parent and by her (adult)
child. Each parent decides how much to consume (
2
p c ) and what size bequest (b) to leave
to her child. The adult child decides how much to consume (cc) and how much to
transfer to her parent (τ). Thus, we have τ + = + s b cp
2 and b e h cc + = + ) ( τ .
No family member can coerce another into transferring resources, nor is there any
mechanism in the capital market to allow for this. Therefore, bequests and transfers must
be non-negative. A further capital market imperfection is that parental savings, s,m u s t
be non-negative.
Suppose the parent has the utility function c p p P W c u c u W δ + + = ) ( ) (
2 1 , while the
adult child’s preferences are ) ( c p C c u W W + = λ .1 > δ > 0 ensures that the parent is
altruistic toward the child, and 1 > λ > 0 ensures that the child is altruistic towards the
parent. ) (c u is a twice-continuously-differentiable function with 0 ) ( ' > c u and
0 ) ( ' ' < c u . With some straightforward substitutions, the child and parent utility functions
may be re- written as: ( ) [ ] ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) (
2 1 δλ λ − + + = c p p c c u c u c u W ,a n d
( ) ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 δλ δ − + + = c
p p
p c u c u c u W .
Recognizing that her consumption depends on her choices for savings, bequests
and education/labor for her child, a parent chooses s, b, and e, assuming that the child
will adjust τ in response to these choices. The child chooses the size of the transfer she5
will give to her parent, conditional on the choices of education, savings, and bequests
made by the parent.
To find equilibrium, we work backwards from the second period, first deriving
the child’s rule for making an optimal transfer. The optimal transfer comes from the
child’s first order condition:
0 ) ( ' ) ( '
2 ≤ − c p c u c u λ (if “<,” then 0 = τ )( 1 )









equal zero when (1) holds with strict inequality, and otherwise can be
found by differentiating equation (1).
Now consider the parent’s choice of savings, bequests, and how much education
to provide for the child, given the child’s rule for making transfers. As in BR,w e
assume that the return function for education is such that in equilibrium, some education
is always chosen, i.e., e > 0. The set of parents’ first-order conditions is thus:
[] 0 ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( '
2 2 1 ≤
∂
∂
− + + −
s
c u c u c u c u c p p p
τ
δ (if “<,” then s =0 ) ( 2 a )




− + + −
e
c u c u e h c u c u c p c p
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δ δ (for e) (2b)




− + + −
b
c u c u c u c u c p c p
τ
δ δ ( i f “ < , ”t h e nb=0) ( 2 c )
An equilibrium in this model is any 4-tuple, { τ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ b e s }, that satisfies the parent’s
and the child’s first-order conditions and yields the highest possible utility to each given
the actions taken, or expected to be taken, by the other.
5 Our objective is to study how
5 Because of the possible feedback effect of parental decisions concerning s, e, and b on children’s
decisions concerning τ, and vice-versa, the parent’s optimization problem may not yield a unique solution6
equilibrium values of education and child labor -- respectively: e ˆ and e ˆ 1− -- vary in
response to changes in A.
We begin by establishing that the three non-negativity constraints rule out certain
equilibrium configurations of savings, bequests and transfers. First, we need not consider
the possibility that both b >0a n dτ > 0, since the behavior of the parent and the child is
affected only by the net of benefits less transfers. We can, in fact, think of the parents as
choosing bequests net -- or in anticipation-- of transfers, τ − b , and substitute the
following condition for equation (2c):
0 ) ( ' ) ( '
2 ≤ + − c p c u c u δ (if “<,” then b - τ < 0) (3)
Without loss of generality, we assume that when b >0 ,t h e nτ = 0, and that when τ >
0, then b =0 .
Second, we can rule out the possibility that s =0w h e nτ =0: the non-negativity
constraint on savings cannot bind if adult children do not make transfers to their parents.
6
This has some intuitive appeal. One instance when adult children make transfers to their
parents is when their “elderly” parents have no savings with which to support themselves.
For the savings constraint to bind when 0 = τ would require, by equation (2a), that
0 ) ( ' ) 1 ( ' < − + − + − b u e A u .( 4 )
This inequality implies b e A − < − +1 , which in turn is impossible because since 0 ≥ b
when 0 = τ , the inequality implies 0 1 < − + e A .
We are left with four types of possible equilibrium configurations of b,τ and s:
to the first-order conditions for a given value of A: there may be more than one local optimum (See the
parametric example below). To find the equilibrium solution in these instances, we need to look beyond
the first-order necessary conditions to determine which of the local optima is the global maximum.
6 This is particularly obvious in our version of the BR model, as the parent earns income only in the first
period, but it is also in any situation where parental earnings are no higher during the second period than
during the first.7
(i) 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ = > = s b τ
(ii) 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ > > = s b τ
(iii) 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ > = = s b τ
(iv) 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ > = > s b τ
We now associate equilibrium education and child labor with each of these
outcome types. BR (Propositions 1 and 4) show that if the non-negativity constraint on
savings and bequests or transfers does not bind (i.e., cases (ii) or (iv)), then the choice of
e implied by equation (2b) satisfies the condition h’(e) = 1. We denote this efficient level
of education by e*.F r o m BR (Propositions 2, 3 and 5) we also infer that in cases (i) and
(iii), the parent chooses inefficiently-low (e<e * )hours of schooling and inefficiently-
high child labor. In case (i), credit constraints prevent the family from making inter-
temporal adjustments that allow it to reach efficiency. In case (iii), efficiency is
compromised because the inter-generational transfers that are needed to bring it about do
not occur.
In order to see how equilibrium education and child labor vary with parental
income, we first define sets:
7
*} ) ( ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ | 0 { 1 1 e a e s b a A < = > = ≥ = τ ,
*} ) ( ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ | 0 { 2 2 e a e s b a A = > ≥ = ≥ = τ ,
*} ) ( ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ | 0 { 3 3 e a e s b a A < > = = ≥ = τ ,a n d
*} ) ( ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ | 0 { 4 4 e a e s b a A = > = ≥ ≥ = τ ;
7 We need not assume there is a continuous range of incomes associated with each equilibrium type.8
where, a stands for particular values of A; i a is any element of set i A ;a n d ) ( ˆ a e is the
amount of schooling that a parent having income a will choose for her child.
For the moment assume that each of the four sets just defined is non-empty. We
now proceed in two steps to show that education could decrease (and child labor could
increase) with an increase in parental income. First, we use Proposition 1 to establish
that set 3 A has at least some elements that are unique to it and which are greater than all
elements in 2 A or 1 A .
Proposition 1: Let } min{ 4
min
4 A a = and }, max{
max
k k A a = k={1,2}. There exists a
positive but small number ε such that
max min
4 k a a > − ε and ε −
min
4 a is unique to 3 A .
Proof: Appendix.
Proposition 1 embodies the fact that a child makes a transfer to her parent when her
parent is relatively poor, while a parent leaves a bequest to her child when the parent is
relatively well off. But since the child gives a stronger weight in her preferences to her
own consumption, the level of income at which transfers are no longer positive will be
strictly less than the level at which the parent begins to make bequests, and this means
that there must be a range of parental incomes where neither transfers nor bequests are
exchanged. In this range, parents and children essentially do not have the same views on
which way the intra-family redistribution of resources should flow. Since any donation
of resources to another family member is voluntary, no donations occur. So as the
parental income rises, equilibrium will transition from one in which transfers are positive9
(low parental incomes) to one in which both transfers and bequests are zero (higher
parental incomes), to one in which bequests are positive (highest parental incomes).
8
Next, in Proposition 2, we establish that some low-income parents who anticipate
that their children will help support them later in life educate their children more than
some higher-income parents who do not anticipate such support from their children. That
is, some of the unique elements of 3 A are associated with lower education levels than the
education levels associated with at least some elements of sets 2 A or 1 A .
Proposition 2: If 1 A or 2 A is non-empty, then there exists an 2 1
' A A ak ∪ ∈ and a unique
3
'
3 A a ∈ such that ,
'
3
' a ak < but ). ( ˆ ) ( ˆ
'
3
' a e a e k >
Proof: Appendix.
To parents with incomes in A1 or A2, the transfer represents in part an anticipated
direct return or repayment to them from their adult children for prior investment in the
children’s education. Parents in A3anticipate no such repayment and since they cannot
finance their optimal consumption in later life without it, they may have to extract more
from the children when they do not have to rely on their children’s voluntary cooperation.
These parents make their children work more while young so that they can carry larger
savings into their later years.
Note that in our statement of Proposition 2 we have assumed that there exists a
(relatively low) parental income level such that we observe positive equilibrium transfers
from the child to the parent. This need not be the case. If, for instance, the degree of
altruism is very low (on both sides), then it is possible that for all non-negative values of
A, there is no equilibrium with positive transfers. Parents always prefer to consume out
8 The existence of a “middle” range of parental incomes for which transfers from children and bequests
from parents are both zero has been pointed out by Laitner (1997), in a model that did not treat human
capital accumulation or child labor.10
of their own saving rather than face a very low relative level of consumption by accepting
transfers. In this case, child education levels would be non-decreasing in parental
income, and child labor would be non-increasing.
III. A Parametric Example
We now suppose that ) ln( ) ( c c u = ,
2 / 1 2 1 ) ( e e h + = (e* =1 ) ,a n d 1 < = λ δ .T h e
relationship between hours worked and parental incomes for this example is shown in
Figure 1, for three different values of the altruism parameter: = = δ λ 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6.
-F i g u r e1h e r e-
Figure 1 shows, first, that e is higher at any level of income, the higher is the level of
altruism. Second, beginning with a parental income of zero, education (e) at first rises
(child labor decreases) with increases in parental income. However, for each level of
altruism, there is parental income level at which transfers from children cease, and there
is a sharp drop in e at that income level.
The discontinuity corresponds to a switch from an equilibrium in which 0 > τ to
one in which 0 = τ . When parental income is relatively low and altruism is not too
small, solutions exist to the first-order conditions in equations (2) that feature 0 > τ
and 0 = τ .
9 The equilibrium is the solution that maximizes parental utility. Which set of
solutions to the first-order condition will a parent prefer? When parental income is very
low, a parent plans on the largess of her relatively well-educated adult child, expecting to
share in her adult child’s relatively high income. She does this even though this means
her second period consumption will be effectively determined by her child’s preferences.
As first-period parental income becomes larger, the parent realizes that she can do better
9 For λ=δ=0.1 (not shown), there is no parental income level for which children give transfers.11
in terms of satisfying her own preferences than planning for her old age by anticipating
the largess of the adult child. At some income level, the parent prefers to achieve
relatively more second-period consumption by saving for it directly through making her
young child work more (school less) but subsequently not sharing in the adult child’s
earnings.
IV. The Empirical Literature
Our main result, the non-monotonicity of the relationship between hours of
education (and child labor) and parental income, is more than simply a theoretical
curiosity.
There is a large body of empirical work in which some measure of parental
income or wealth is entered as an explanatory variable for child labor or child
schooling.
10 Nearly all of this literature assumes monotonicity in the relationship
between the right- and left-hand-side variables and finds a monotonically increasing
relationship between income and child schooling and a monotonically decreasing
relationship between income and child labor.
11 These relationships are often not
statistically significant. Common reasons offered for this weak relationship include
measurement error in, or unaccounted for endogeneity of, the income variables, which
would tend to bias their marginal effect toward zero.
12 To these explanations, we
suggests another plausible concern: specification error. Our findings indicate that the
relationship of child labor (and schooling) to parental resources is not monotonic.
10 For surveys related to child labor, see Edmonds (2002) or Dar et al (2002). Behrman (1999) or Behrman
and Knowles (1999) contain surveys related to schooling.
11 Exceptions to the assumption of monotonicity may be found in Bhalotra (2001) and Edmonds (2002)
who use non-parametric techniques. Interestingly, the relationship between income (expenditures) and
child labor in these papers is found to contain peaks and valleys, which is perhaps pertinent to the theory
we discuss.
12 Correcting for some common specification errors still produces income effects that are rather small
(Bhalotra 2001).12
Measured marginal effects of income based on an assumption that it is would tend to be
forced toward zero.
Of much more direct interest in connection with our main result is the empirical
literature on transfers from children to parents.
13 While this literature does not touch
upon child labor issues, it nevertheless offers evidence that is consistent with the behavior
of parents and children that comes out of the model we study in this paper.
In the model of this paper, children give transfers only when parental resources
are relatively small; however, when the savings constraint is binding on parents, children
may increase the amount of their transfers when parental income increases. Figure 2,
which is derived from the parametric example of the previous section, shows that the
amount of transfers could increase with parental income (when saving constraint is
binding) or have an inverted-U shape (for parental incomes along the negatively-sloped
portion, the savings constraint does not bind). Child education creates a quid pro quo
arrangement: a higher transfer is made in return for higher schooling. In the literature
on intra-household allocation, this type of behavior is referred to as the exchange motive
for transfers [eg., Cox (1987), Cox and Rank (1992), Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998)].
These predictions are consistent with a growing body of empirical evidence.
Lillard and Willis (1997), for instance, find strong evidence that transfers from grown
Malaysian children to their parents are motivated by the “repayment hypothesis:”
children give transfers to their parents to repay their parents for sending them to school.
They find that the probability of a transfer is decreasing in parents’ income. They also
find that, given that transfers occur, the transfers are increasing in the father’s income
(they are increasing in mother’s income but the effect is not statistically significant).
13 For surveys of other theoretical and empirical work on this topic, see Laitner (1997), Cox (1987).13
These are all results that are entirely consistent with the behavior of transfers in the BR
model when parents are savings-constrained.
Lucas and Stark (1995) find similar results for remittance behavior in a sample of
rural households in Botswana. They find that remittances rise with the remitter’s
educational attainment by a significantly greater amount when the remitter is the adult
child of a member of the recipient household, and interpret this as evidence that the
parent’s provision of schooling was an implicit loan to their children. Finally, they also
find that the probability of receiving a remittance is decreasing in recipient income, and
that conditional on remittance receipt, the amount of the remittance increases with
recipient income.
Most of this work has specified the transfer function in a way that rules out the
inverted-U shape that is possible in this model. A recent exception is a study of Peruvian
households by Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998). This paper explores possible nonlinearity
in the behavior of transfers by allowing recipient income to enter the transfer equation in
a spline specification, and finds an inverted-U shape in the relationship between transfers
from adult children to their parents and parental income.
14
In short, recent empirical literature on transfers from adult children to their
parents is entirely consistent with our findings in this paper. This literature finds
evidence of an exchange motive determining the amount of transfers parents receive. We
identify one form this quid pro quo can take (less child labor in exchange for larger
transfers), and demonstrate the surprising implication that the relationship between
14 Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998) and Cox and Rank (1992) find that parent’s transfers to children increase
(or follow an inverted-U shape) with the child’s income. In the BR framework, this effect is ruled out by
assuming children, while young, do not have the option of severing relations with their parents and
supplying no child labor.14
parental resources and child labor is non-monotonic. Our work raises this relationship as
a serious area for further empirical scrutiny.
We conclude by noting that there is a very small empirical literature (we know of
only two papers) that links parental altruism with child labor and child schooling. Its
findings can also be explained in the terms of the BR model. In a study of nineteenth-
century American industrial families, Parsons and Goldin (1989) find that they cannot
reject the hypothesis that parents sent their children to work because they could not
appropriate part of their children’s future incomes. In terms of the BR model, this
behavior is consistent either with values of λ that are close to zero, or with young
parents’ income (which includes income from children working) being sufficiently high
relative to their children’s anticipated adult earnings. In a more recent paper, Bhalotra
(2001) finds evidence for Pakistan that transfers from parents are altruistically motivated,
because child consumption increases with parental consumption. In the BR model, when
parents provide bequests to their children, the same is true.
V. Conclusions
In stark contrast to the widely held view that reductions in poverty must reduce
child labor, we have found, in the context of the BR model with two-sided altruism, that
higher parental income can lead to an increase in child labor. This surprising result
derives from the systematic way capital market constraints bind as parental income rises.
Adult children raised in poor families make transfers to their elderly parents to repay
them for income lost when the children, while young, were sent to school instead of to
work. If preferences of parents and children are not identical, then at some sufficiently
high level of parental income, both transfers and the hours of extra education the transfers15
made possible cease. It is not until parents are wealthy enough to leave bequests, and
therefore to enjoy utility solely from making their children better off, that education
levels fully recover.
While the predictions of the model with regard to the relationship between income
and child labor or education have yet to be tested, the model yields predictions consistent
with empirical evidence on the flow of transfers from adult children to their parents.
When adult children have high income relative to their parents, the model suggests that
the children make transfers. Rising parental income decreases the probability of such a
transfer; however, if the parent is constrained to have non-negative savings, which is a
sufficient condition for ensuring a transfer, rising parental income is associated with a
larger transfer. If the parent receives a transfer but is not savings constrained, the size of
the transfer may decrease with increased incomes. A number of empirical studies
provide evidence consistent with these patterns of predicted behavior.
In the end then, this paper makes three contributions. First, it rigorously
demonstrates a surprising reason to question the usual assumption that increases in
parental income will bring forth less child labor and more child schooling. Second, it
shows that there is enough support for other predictions of the model to suggest that the
possible non-monotonicity in the relationship between income and child labor or child
schooling should be searched for with more empirical rigor. Finally, it establishes a
bridge between the literatures on child labor and intergenerational transfers. With further
scrutiny, this bridge may be particularly important for researchers and policymakers
interested in determining strategies that will work in bringing about the eventual
elimination of child labor and the attainment of efficient levels of education for children.16
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1: Let } min{ 4
min
4 A a = and }, max{
max
k k A a = k={1,2}. There exists a
positive but small number ε such that
max min
4 k a a > − ε and ε −
min
4 a is unique to 3 A .
Proof: We begin by establishing that ) ( 3 2 1
min
4 A A A a ∪ ∪ ∉ . To do this we first note
that any equilibrium associated with 4 a is a solution to the parent’s optimization problem
that does not imply binding non-negativity constraints on b or s. In effect, the parents
with incomes in 4 A face an unconstrained optimization problem. If 4 a also implies a
solution to the first-order conditions associated with another i A {i = 1, 2, 3}, the utility
level associated with that latter solution to the first-order conditions must be strictly
lower than the solution in 4 A because the latter solution is one in which either the
savings or the bequests constraint binds. Thus any equilibrium solution associated with
4 a is unique.
Next, we verify that for any 4 a , 0
) ( ' ' 2 ) ( ' '















. This implies two
things: (i) the only point in 4 A at which b ˆ=0i s
min
4 a =min{ 4 A }; and, (ii) i a a >
min
4
{i =1 ,2 ,3 } .
Now note that the first-order conditions for b and τ cannot hold with equality at
the same time. In particular, at
min
4 a , τ ˆ =0 because the first-order condition for τ holds
with strict inequality. This means that there exists a positive but small number ε such
that
max min
4 k a a > − ε and that ε −
min
4 a is unique to 3 A .
Proposition 2: If 1 A or 2 A is non-empty, then there exists an 2 1
' A A ak ∪ ∈ and an
3
'
3 a a ∈ such that ,
'
3
' a ak < but ). ( ˆ ) ( ˆ
'
3
' a e a e k >
Proof: There are two cases to consider: (i) 2 A non-empty; and, (ii) 1 A non-empty.
(i) In this case, we can take , 2








' a ak < while by the definitions of A2 and A3,w eh a v e ). ( ˆ * ) ( ˆ
'
3
' a e e a e k > =
(ii) We now consider the case now where A2 is empty but A1 is not. Let ξ be some small
but positive number arbitrarily set so that ξ +
max
1 a is in the interior of 3 A . Proposition 1
and ensures that such an ξ exists. The remainder of the proof works toward showing that




1 ξ + > a e a e
The first-order condition for e when ξ + =
max
1 a A is:
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1 = + − − + + − e h u e h s e a u δ ξ17
Meanwhile, the first-order condition for s says that parents want to smooth their
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The first-order condition for e, when
max
1 a A = is:





− − + − + − + −
e
e h u u e h e h u e a u
τ
τ δ τ τ δ (c)
where, ()







) ( ' ' ' '
) ( ' ) ( ' '
e h u u
e h e h u
e
. Recall from the child’s first-order condition that




in (c), allows us to combine terms and re-write the first-order
condition for e, when
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1 a A = as:
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1 ξ + > a e a e .
To do this we first evaluate the right-hand sides of both expressions at ) ( ˆ
max
1 a e e = and
show that at that value of e, the right-hand side of (b) exceeds the right-hand side of (d).
This is done in two steps. First, we verify that
)) ( ˆ ( ( ' / )
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by noting that for sufficiently small ξ ,
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1 a e h a e h < − τ ; and recalling that u(.) exhibits diminishing
marginal utility. Next, we establish that:18
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This can be verified directly:
() [] () τ τ δλ τ τ λ λδ − + > − + ) ( ' ' ) ( ' ' ) ( ' ' ) ( ' '
2 e h u u e h u u ,s o () 0 ) ( ' ' ) 1 ( > − − τ λδ e h u .
Since 1 < λ δ by assumption, this inequality must hold. Using the results of these two
steps, and recalling that by definition (d) is satisfied when ) ( ˆ
max
1 a e e = , we determine that
(b) is not satisfied. In particular,
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Compare this last expression with (a). Since the left-hand side of this expression
decreases in e, while the right-hand side increases, the only way to achieve the equality
necessary in (a) is for e to fall below ). ( ˆ
max
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Figure 1
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